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MAJORITY RULE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
Dr. Gavin Maasdorp*
Rhodesia w ill take the step to majority rule, as Zimbabwe, ju st over 30 years 
after the post-World War I I  rush to independence started, and ju st over 20 years 
after that phenomenon h it  sub-Saharan Africa.
The attainment of majority rule in Rhodesia w ill take place under two important 
and unique planning circumstances. F irs t ,  the new government w ill have the 
lessons of a quarter of a century of Third World economic development to draw 
upon in framing it s  development strategy. I t  should therefore be possible to 
avoid many of the mistakes which have been made in other countries over th is 
period.
Second, no other African country w ill have attained majority rule with so 
d iversified  and so sophisticated a modern sector in it s  economy, and especially 
with such a large industria l base. This factor at the same time provides a 
considerable advantage in development planning and poses a number of problems 
with which the planners and po litic ian s w ill have to grapple.
Economic policy in Rhodesia to date has been dictated by, and directed largely 
to, the needs of the White minority who have dominated the electorate. The 
economic welfare of the African majority has been regarded as of secondary 
importance. Thus the African majority, although i t  w ill enjoy po litica l 
power, w ill find economic power vested in the White population. It  is  only 
re a lis t ic  to anticipate that the new government w ill place the interests of 
the African majority f i r s t ,  and that i t  w ill have a different set of economic 
objectives which w ill include increasing the share of Africans in the wealth 
of the country and reducing the White/African income gap.
The aim of th is paper is  to d iscuss the changing emphasis in development 
planning, and the implications of current thinking fo r development strategy 
in a changed po litica l climate. As a v is ito r  from south of the border who 
has no first-hand knowledge of the local economy, I w ill refer to empirical 
evidence on Rhodesia only to il lu stra te  particular points.
THE CHANGING EMPHASIS IN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
Development economics is  a post-World War I I  d isc ip line . When the Inter­
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development - more commonly known as the 
World Bank - was established at Bretton Woods in 1944, i t  was intended to focus
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on the reconstruction of war-ravaged Europe, When th is was more or less 
complete by about 1950, attention was turned to the under-developed parts of 
the world where independence movements were gathering force. Thus serious 
thought was f i r s t  devoted to the problems of what is  now generally called the 
Third World only from the early 1950's. The f i r s t  development plan contained 
a m u ltip lic ity  of objectives but soon, largely under the influence of writers 
such as W. Arthur Lewis, the emphasis was placed on economic growth. Later, 
as experience and empirical evidence accumulated, the emphasis in development 
planning changed.
We may d istingu ish  four approaches to planning in developing countries. These 
are the growth-orientated strategy, the employment-orientated strategy, the 
anti-poverty strategy and the basic needs strategy. I t  is  worth b rie fly  
examining each of these in turn.
Growth-Orientated Strategy
This was the predominent approach until about the end of the 1960s, Emphasis 
was placed on increasing output by increasing the rate of savings and invest­
ment, and hence of capital formation, in the modern sector. I t  was assumed 
that the rapid growth of GDP would lead to an increased standard of liv ing  
by expanding the modern sector and contracting the traditional sector which 
would supply labour to the modern sector. Investments were concentrated on 
the provision of infrastructure and on d irectly  productive sectors such as 
agriculture and industry, although investment in social sectors later received 
increased attention. But despite the high rates of economic growth attained 
in many developing countries, it  became apparent that the benefits of growth 
were accruing to only a minority of the population and that the relative 
(although not necessarily the absolute) position of the majority was deterio­
rating. The gap between rich and poor was widening and the beneficiaries 
were those who were fortunate enough to obtain wage employment.
It  appears that th is experience was true of Rhodesia too, Between 1966-74, 
real GDP increased at an average rate of 8 percent per annum, but the average 
non-African/African real earnings gap increased from $2 248 in 1964 to 
$3 358 in 1975, accelerating after 1970. The gap also widened re lative ly  
(from 10.2:1 in 1964 to 11:1) in 1975.
The other three strategies are a ll variations on a theme very d ifferent from 
that of the growth-orientated strategy. With economic growth largely by­
passing the masses, an in-depth re-examination of Third World economic 
problems was undertaken, commencing with the World Employment Programme 
in itiated in 1967 by the International Labour Organisation and undertaken in 
conjunction with the United Nations Development Programme from 1970 onwards. 
Thus, from the early 1970s, a new focus was found in national development 
plans.
-Employment-Orientated Strategy
This was the f i r s t  strategy to emerge from the World Employment Programme. 
As Dudley Seers, leader of the f i r s t  two country missions, put it ,  the real 
meaning of development covers a reduction of unemployment, poverty and
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inequality. This approach viewed the creation of productive employment 
opportunities as the vehicle by which the benefits of economic growth would 
be spread more evenly throughout the population, thereby re-d istributing 
resources to the poor. Economic growth, although important, was regarded as 
a secondary objective. This approach gave r ise  to an examination of appro­
priate technologies since it  advocated the use of labour-intensive rather than 
capital-intensive techniques. The economic growth rate necessary to achieve 
the desired employment levels was, however, found to be higher than could be 
attained in most developing countries.
Anti-poverty Strategy
Since the employment-orientated strategy s t i l l  did not appear to reach the 
lowest-income households, attempts were made to define poverty in absolute 
terms and then to formulate a strategy to raise per capita incomes above a 
poverty line. In th is way, income inequalities would be reduced. This 
strategy stressed access to productive assets and employment; consumption 
and investment are redirected to the lowest-income groups and economic growth 
is  again a secondary consideration. However, i t  has been found that in most 
developing countries a large proportion of the poor cannot obtain jobs which 
offer wages above the poverty line. Moreover, the transfer of investible 
resources from rich to poor may lead to a lower level of private sector 
activ ity  and of aggregate economic growth which in fact h its  the poorest house­
holds hardest. Thus the ra ising  of per capita incomes above the poverty line  
is  linked with continued aggregate economic growth.
The Basic Needs Strategy
Because of the shortcomings of the employment and anti-poverty strategies the 
ILO has suggested a new approach in development planning which aims at meeting 
the basic needs of the population by the turn of the century. These needs 
consist of -
i) personal requirements (food, clothing, shelter); and
i i )  access to public services (health, sanitation, water, 
education, transport, etc.).
This strategy seeks to eliminate absolute poverty and to reduce relative 
poverty. I t  seeks to quantify the targets wherever possible, e.g. daily 
intake of calories, area of dwelling space per person, percentage of dwelling 
units with water-borne sewerage and e lectric ity , etc. Development policy is 
aimed at increasing the output of basic goods and services, and creating 
adequately remunerative employment, thereby attaining household consumption 
targets. Continued economic growth is  clearly necessary under such a strategy, 
but the pattern of growth is  redirected to the supply and d istribution of 
essential goods and services.
In each of the three more recent strategies, economic growth is  required not 
for growth's sake but to f u l f i l  d istributional objectives. In other words, 
a different kind of economic growth is  envisaged. Given the almost worldwide 
stress today on greater egalitarianism, i t  is  d if f ic u lt  to envisage any 
sign ificant deviation from this trend of planning philosophy; i t  is  probably
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not a passing fashion, although no doubt these new strategies w ill be subjected 
to critica l scrutiny as improved data become available. Thinking is  not static , 
and already work is  under way on the identification and quantification of 
indices of development. These indices are then to be used as partial welfare 
indicators, in addition to per capita income, to determine the extent to which 
the poor are benefiting from economic growth. But i t  is  important to stress 
that economic growth has not been thrown out with the bathwater; as Lai 
emphasizes, ". . .  e ffic ien t growth which raises the demand for labour is  
probably the single most important means available for allev iating poverty in 
the Third World."
Redistribution and Growth
An important question which arises from the foregoing discussion is  whether 
growth is  incompatible with equality. This was considered in a recent study 
which sifted empirical evidence. But, before considering the results of this 
study, i t  is  important to note that there cannot be absolute income equality, 
i.e. the Gini co-efficient can never be zero except in textbooks. Human 
nature being what i t  is ,  every society has it s  e lite  irrespective of the 
political ideology being followed. The most that can be hoped for in any 
society is  that extremes of extravagant affluence and dire poverty can be 
averted, that even the poorest household w ill have access to certain minimum 
services and income, and that there is  due respect for human rights. Utopia 
cannot be attained.
What then are the main lessons of the study for our purposes? They seem to be 
three-fold. F irs t ,  i f  we divide countries into three groups (so c ia list, 
developed and less developed), the highest degree of income equality is found 
in so c ia lis t  countries. There the poorest 40 percent receive an average 25 
percent of total income. This may therefore be regarded as the most that can 
be hoped for in the Third World by the turn of the century.
Second, the results are mixed. There is  no clear relationship between economic 
growth and the degree of inequality at any particular time or over time. Some 
countries with high growth rates have managed to redistribute incomes.
Third, inequality is  not necessarily related to po litica l ideology. Although 
the so c ia lis t  countries have the most equitably distributed income overall, 
there is a wide range of relationships. Among the developing countries which 
reduced inequality between 1950-75, some were e xp lic it ly  cap ita list  and some 
exp lic it ly  so c ia list .  Among the formeywere South Korea and Taiwan, where 
entrepreneurial s k i l l s  were used to bodst exports, and the OPEC countries which 
relied on the export of a natural resource. Among the latter were China and 
Cuba, with centrally-planned economies, and possibly Tanzania, with an African 
variant of socialism. There is ,  therefore, more than one ideologically 
feasible route to equitable growth and development; the reduction of inequality 
in Korea and Taiwan was a by-product of growth po lic ies while in Cuba i t  was 
d irectly attributable to conscious government policy.
What is  needed is  a government which is  genuinely committed to reducing 
inequality, which can persuade key interest groups of the necessity for change, 
and which can introduce and maintain an effic ient organizational structure.
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Po litica l s ta b ilit y  is  also an important factor in implementing po lic ies which 
reduce inequality.
THE CHOICE BEFORE ZIMBABWE.
Developing countries, then, can choose from a variety of ideological paths.
At the two extremes are the la issez fa ire  and command economies. The former 
does not ex ist anywhere, except in textbooks, but the latter does and is  
represented by the Marxist/Leninist model. However, even a country such as 
Angola, which is  regarded as Marxist, encourages investment by multinational 
corporations, and has in fact adopted a three-sector economy (state, 
co-operative and private) in which the private sector is  encouraged as long as 
it  adheres to the economic policies of the government.
Ideology is ,  however, a key determinant of the future economic path. What 
sort of government w ill emerge in Zimbabwe is  unclear but i t  seems reasonable 
to assume for present purposes that there w ill be a reformist government 
operating a mixed economy. The approach of such a government would probably 
be eclectic rather than doctrinaire, and it s  f i r s t  p rio r ity  might well be an 
inter-racial rather than inter-personal redistribution of income. While th is 
would have an in sign ificant impact on the Gini co-efficient, i t  could be 
p o lit ic a lly  important.
The World Bank could be expected to have a sign ifican t influence on the new 
government since the country w ill need foreign aid and expertise. Because 
of it s  widespread practical involvement in developing countries, the Bank 
exerts a strong influence on the policies of other international aid 
organisations and hence on the direction and sectoral allocation of other 
bilateral and multilateral aid.
The World Bank is  now committed to more equitable development po lic ie s, and in 
particular to reaching the poorest 40 percent of fam ilies. Since such fam ilies 
reside mainly in the rural areas, the Bank attaches a high p rio rity  to invest­
ment in rural development. But since 1975, i t  has also emphasized programmes 
aimed at improving the lo t of the urban poor. The Bank, however, also stresses 
the importance of a continued inflow of capital and the development of exports; 
i t  believes that th is, together with policies aimed at reaching the poor, can 
accelerate economic growth and improve social and economic welfare as well as 
po litica l s ta b ility  in a country.
There are sound po litica l reasons why the new government in Zimbabwe would want 
to emphasize redistribution. Of the total population, 58 percent is  in the 
African subsistence areas and another 22 percent in White rural areas. The 
African areas are the most populous in the country and their po litica l support 
w ill therefore be keenly sought; since they are the problem areas, their 
inhabitants w ill have to feel that they are benefiting from government policies.
Most countries which have become independent have found that almost a ll capital 
was owned by foreigners. But in Rhodesia, there is  a s ign ifican t degree of 
domestic ownership of capital, and thus under majority rule the new government 
could influence economic decisions to the advantage of the African population. 
It  could, for instance, discriminate in favour of domestic capital, and control 
the conditions under which foreign capital is  invested as well as the direction 
of that investment. Moreover, state capital has become increasingly powerful
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since UDI - according to Stoneman i t  represents some 40 percent of a ll invest­
ment today, Rhodesia having increasingly followed the South African pattern of 
combining free enterprise with more state investment in infrastructure and 
productive ac t iv it ie s  than is  common in most mixed economies. Since 1965, 
almost a ll large investments have been undertaken either by foreign concerns or 
the state. There is  no evidence of a marked decline in foreign ownership of 
the economy; in fact, i t  has probably gained in certain sectors, although 
domestic private capital has also probably increased it s  re lative  strength in 
some sectors.
So the position in Rhodesia as majority rule approaches d iffe rs from that 
experienced elsewhere at the time of independence. But the government w ill 
have to watch that a new e lite  (in both the public and private sectors) is  not 
incorporated into an economic power structure dominated by foreign or local 
White interests. Unless the new government is  able to change the economic 
strategy of the country, a reduction in inequality w ill not be realised. But 
can i t  do so while the economy is  dominated by non-Africans? The Afrikaners 
in South Africa have shown that i t  is  possible for a ruling group to improve 
it s  economic position through the use of po litica l power; when the present 
South African government came to power in 1948, the economy was dominated by 
local English-speaking and foreign interests. The Afrikaners may not dominate 
the economy today, but their economic power has increased considerably. They 
mould the policy and make the decisions, and have reduced the English/Afrikaans 
income gap considerably. Predominantly English organisations, such as the 
Chamber of Commerce, are clearly not as influential today as they were th irty  
years*" ago. The parallel between Afrikaners in South Africa in 1948 and 
Africans in Zimbabwe in 1978 may not be identical, but the lesson is  that it  
should be possible for the new African government increasingly to control the 
economy.
One thing, however, is  certain : racial discrim ination, which is  an important
obstacle to redistributing wealth in Zimbabwe, w ill have to go. In fact, 
Southern Africa as a whole will not be stable until racial discrimination is  
eliminated wherever i t  is found.
TOOLS OF REDISTRIBUTION
What is  the extent of inequality in Zimbabwe and what tools of redistribution 
are available to the government? Chenery £ t al c la ss ify  Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 
among the 23 countries with the highest inequaTTty in 1968, i.e . the poorest 
40 percent of individual earners, or households received less than 12 percent 
of total income. In Zimbabwe, the poorest 40 percent received 8,2 percent 
of total income, the middle of 40 percent received 22,8 percent, and the 
richest qu intile  69 percent. In 1969 i t  was calculated that the per capita 
GNP was US$274. Absolute poverty levels were illu strated  by the fact that
17.4 percent of the population had a per capita income of US$50 per annum while
37.4 percent received less than US$75 per annum. In the same year, the Gini
co-efficient for Zimbabwe was calculated at ,65. This referred only to employ­
ment in the wage sector and would have been higher had the traditional sector 
been included. Nevertheless, i t  was s t i l l  approximately double the degree of 
inequality found in countries such as Australia and Brita in  where the co­
e ffic ient was ,32 and ,34 respectively.
Income d isparitie s between White and African have already been quoted; such
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d isparities also ex ist between African rural areas and the rest of the country. 
Income inequality therefore exists on both a racial and spatial basis.
There are numerous tools at the disposal of any government wishing to effect a 
redistribution of wealth. Because time does not allow me to mention them a ll,
I w ill lim it my discussion to those which appear most applicable in the 
circumstances, namely, control of assets and factor prices, taxation and the 
use of technology.
C ontrol of Assets
This really refers to nationalization. I t  has been suggested that some 50 per­
cent of the White population may leave Zimbabwe after a po litica l settlement, 
and that th is w ill comprise mainly recent immigrants and non-citizens with no 
deep emotional ties to the country. Should this happen, there would be an 
opportunity for the government to nationalize the farms and industries owned 
by these emigrants. But the extent to which Whites w ill leave is  unknown; 
much w ill no doubt depend on the ideological stance of the new government.
As an alternative to nationalization, the government could enter into partner­
ship with foreign investors in key sectors or industries, e.g. by taking a 
certain shareholding in mining, agricultural and industrial enterprises, and 
also in banking and financial institutions. A good example of th is is  
Swaziland. But this may merely mean increasing inequality among Africans with 
a small e lite  collecting directors fees; much depends on what happens to the 
government's share of dividends and profits.
In Zimbabwean agriculture, land reform is  an obvious tool. Although Africans 
and Whites both possess 46,6 percent of the land area, there are marked 
differences in quality of land and population density. In 1974, non-Africans 
comprised only 5 percent of the total population and were 88 percent urbanized. 
Thus the rural non-African population comprised less than 1 percent of the 
total population but owned over two-fifths of the land.
African land consists mainly of communal tenure supporting a subsistence 
economy (the former Tribal Trust Lands) with some t it le  deed land (5-10 ha. 
farms with cash cropping and improved animal husbandry). The 1969 census 
revealed a population density in the TTLs of at least three times that on White 
farms, even the best quality land in the TTLs having a density double that on 
White farms. And 57 percent is  overpopulated, only 27 percent carrying the 
optimum population.
The quality of African-held land is  in fe rio r to that in the White areas. It  
is  generally of poor quality - only 10 percent is  regarded as "good quality" 
land while 75 percent is  c la ssified  as 'very poor/unsuitable' for agriculture. 
The TTLs also have a lower potential than the rest of the country. For 
example, less than 10 percent of Tribal Trust Land is  'f a i r ly  good' compared 
with 40 percent in Zimbabwe as a whole; at the other end of the scale almost 
one-quarter has 'no potential' compared with only one-eighth in the country as 
a whole.
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A number of writers have referred to unused and underused land on White farms, 
and th is represents a potential transfer to Africans. Land is  an explosive 
political factor and a cause of racial il l- fe e lin g .  Dunlop, for example, 
states that the existing apportionment of land between the races cannot be 
justified  on grounds of equity or economic and social stab ility . This land 
could be redistributed on the basis of either communal or individual holdings, 
or some combination of the two.
But i t  would s t i l l  leave large private White holdings. I t  might be possible 
for the government to follow the Sri Lankan land reform programme by placing 
a ce iling on land holding by any one person for different types of land; 
land in excess of that size  would then be available for redistribution.
The problem with land reform, however, is  one of maintaining productivity.
To gain the maximum advantage from redistribution, i t  is  clearly important to 
maximize the income earned from redistributed assets. It  is ,  of course, 
possible that land productivity may increase as farm size is  reduced because of 
the more intensive application of labour. But much depends on whether 
complementary inputs are provided by government; these include marketing 
channels, credit, fe r t i l iz e r  and so on, and w ill be dealt with later'. I f  these 
are not provided timeously, land reform may lead to fa llin g  output and prove 
ineffective as an instrument of income redistribution. In some African 
countries the transfer of White land to Africans has led to declining output, 
but th is need not necessarily be so, e.g. the sub-division of large White 
farms into more labour-intensive units in Kenya led to increasing yields.
Turning now to the nationalization of industries, the benefits may be lost i f  
efficiency is  not maintained. Bureaucracies, of course, are not usually 
noted for their efficiency. Moreover , i f  the industry is  characterised by 
capital-intensive techniques and high wages, the benefits may in any case be 
limited only to employees. There is  therefore a need for government to 
control urban wage levels.
In the circumstances, i t  might be better for government to participate in 
equity capital. A problem with private investment is  that interest, dividends 
and profit accrue to local shareholders, thereby increasing income inequality, 
while the repatriation of interest, dividends and profits to non-resident 
shareholders not only diverts earnings away from investment to the servicing of 
debt repayments, but increases the country's reliance on new foreign investment. 
But repatriation of earnings may exceed the inflow of foreign capital; evidence 
shows that manufacturing industry in Zimbabwe is  s t i l l  a net user of foreign 
exchange. However, i f  the government is a large shareholder, i t  w ill not only 
be able to ensure that the local share of dividends and interest is available 
for redistribution, but it  w ill also be in a position to influence decisions to 
reinvest an increasing proportion of profits. This might be re lative ly easy 
in Zimbabwe; there are no really large-scale industries in the country so 
that the government might be able to obtain large shareholdings re lative ly 
inexpensively. Moreover, because of sanctions, there is  already a substantial 
government control on the repatriation of profits and a forced reinvestment of 
profits. In th is respect, sanctions appear to have made the climate for govern­
ment participation in industry more favourable than i t  otherwise might have been.
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Control of Factor Prices
Another tool available to government is  to intervene in factor markets so as 
to reduce the price of labour relative to capital and thus encourage employ­
ment creation.
I have already mentioned the need to control urban wages. Because of the 
economic dualism between those in wage employment and those who are not, i t  
is  sometimes argued that minimum wages should be abolished and that collective 
bargaining arrangements should be weakened. Yet in Zimbabwe, many writers 
call for the establishment of minimum wage rates equivalent at least to the 
poverty datum line, and especially for higher wages in fanning. Since the 
government would want to reduce absolute poverty, and the PDL can be regarded 
as a rough measure thereof, i t  is  clearly desirable that family incomes 
should at least equal the PDL. The point really  is  that those in wage employ­
ment should not be allowed to become an e lite  who are able to bid up wages and 
keep others out.
The problem in Zimbabwe is  that the salary and wage structure in managerial 
and sk illed  positions in both the private and public sector is  based on 
developed country rates and is  unsuited to a developing country. The 
government should therefore continue to control the wage structure; the 
d iff ic u lty  for government, however, is  that job creation, for which there is  
like ly  to be strong po litica l pressure, is  often easiest in the public services, 
and that c iv il servants expect wage increases. But distorted wage structures 
also lead to a greater demand for higher education. Since middle- and high- 
income fam ilies in it ia l ly  provide most of the trained manpower, such education 
and employment creation merely increase inequality. Chenery et al_ argue that 
re lative wages for certain types of employment should actuallyUe reduced.
Controlling the price of capital is  also important in developing countries. 
Taxes, interest rates, rebates and so on can be controlled so as to sh ift  
income from the richer groups. Here i t  is  especially important that suitable 
in stitu tions be created to ensure that a ll sectors of the economy have ready 
access to capital. I t  is  usually d if f ic u lt  fo r the traditional sector to 
obtain capital, but the price of capital could be increased in sectors using 
capital-intensive technology and reduced in the more labour-intensive sectors.
Taxation
Another fisca l measure relates to taxation. Direct taxation is  effectively 
limited to the wage sector, but the government might be able to increase 
property taxes among the highest-income groups. However, indirect taxation 
is  usually more important than direct taxation. It  is  generally agreed today 
that indirect taxation in developing countries should differentiate between 
consumer groups and should be aimed at the consumption of luxury goods; the 
incidence of taxation on poorer fam ilies can be reduced by lowering taxes on 
mass consumption goods (such as food) or even exempting such goods. I f  the 
importing of such goods is  not restricted or prohibited, taxation can be used 
to reduce the consumption of goods unsuited to developing countries. To take 
a simple example, what is  the more suitable vehicle for a developing country -
a Volkswagen or a Mercedes?
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Appropriate Technology
The question of appropriate goods for developing countries leads on to the 
related question of appropriate technology.
Clearly, employment creation w ill be a major and continuing problem in 
Zimbabwe for the foreseeable future. Some data is  available to illu stra te  
the magnitude of th is problem. Estimates for the period to 1984 put the 
required employment creation at 50 000 male and 10 000 female jobs per annum. 
But between 1969-1975 only 35 000 jobs were created annually, i.e . a short­
fa ll of 25 000 each year. Another estimate of the jobs created between 
1969-1975 is  only 22 000 per annum and this only heightens the disparity. 
According to Hawkins, an economic growth rate of 9 percent per annum is  
required i f  the job target of 60 000 per annum is to be met.
It  is  therefore important to maximize employment in a ll sectors of the 
economy and to encourage the use of labour-intensive technology wherever 
possible. Labour is  the abundant factor endowment in Zimbabwe, capital the 
scarce. But substitution of labour for capital is  not always possible, 
either for technical or economic reasons, or both. For example, i f  processed 
goods are to be competitive on export markets they must meet certain minimum 
standards, and may have to be produced by capital-intensive methods.
Technology, consumption patterns and income d istribution are closely linked.
I f  income d istribution is  highly skewed, there is  a demand for luxury 
consumption goods, and th is influences the type of goods produced and the 
technology used. But the judicious use of taxes or subsidies can influence 
consumption patterns by switching demand away from capital-intensive goods.
In Zimbabwe, new manufacturing industry between 1964-75 was re lative ly 
labour-intensive. This was a period of severe import control and industry 
had to adapt accordingly. Hawkins argues that at the early stages of 
industria lization, it  is  re lative ly  easy to apply labour-intensive techniques, 
but that the next stage of industria lization, i.e. of capital and producer 
goods, techniques w ill have to be more capital-intensive. Moreover, as 
output increases and economies of scale are realized, labour-intensity 
declines. The potential for using intermediate technology declines as the 
country becomes more industrialized. This may be true, but even in South 
Africa government spokesmen have begun to stress the need for using labour- 
intensive techniques wherever possible. I t  would seem, therefore, that 
Zimbabwean indu stria lists  have an opportunity very carefully to examine the 
techniques used in new industry. In particular, the development of small- 
scale industry, to which labour-intensive technology is  well suited, ought to 
be explored. This would probably require local research into the development 
of appropriate techniques.
RURAL AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
It  is  time now to consider how these tools of redistribution may be applied 
to different sectors of the economy. I w ill focus the discussion mainly on 
the rural and urban populations since a strong emphasis is  placed by aid 
agencies on the poor in these categories.
Rural Development
Most international aid, for example, from the World Bank and the B ritish  
M inistry of Overseas Development, is  now directed towards rural development 
programmes. Writers have made a strong case for such programmes in Zimbabwe. 
Thus, Hawkins cites the Whitsun Foundation figures regarding the TTLs - they 
include 42 percent of the land area, contain 58 percent of the population and 
account for 8 - 1 0  percent of GDP, but receive less than 3 percent of total 
national investment. The last figure refers to public sector investment, 
and such investment w ill c learly have to be directed away from the urban and 
White areas to the African rural areas.
No concerted effort has been made to develop these areas. Despite the value of 
African farm sales increasing more rapidly than that of White farm sales, the 
African areas are net importers of maize, the staple foodstuff, and i t  is  perhaps 
widely believed that rural development programmes are a waste of effort. I t  is  
true that many such programmes in the Third World have fa iled , and a recent World 
Bank publication stated that "knowledge of rural development is  s t i l l  at a 
rudimentary stage."
However, some programmes have succeeded and a picture is  now emerging of what 
the ingredients for success are. There are important constraints - financia l, 
manpower and institutiona l - facing rural planners. The success of rural 
development programmes in improving the standard of liv in g  of the poor depends 
on a number of key elements, among those which have been identified being: a
knowledge of local customs and in stitu tion s, appropriate marketing channels and 
pricing policies, storage fa c i l it ie s ,  transport fa c i l it ie s  (such as feeder roads 
and collection services), technical aid, credit, security of tenure, and 
innovative technologies. A further important factor relates to the ava ilab ility  
of trained manpower. Such manpower usually prefers urban employment, and th is 
is  another reason for keeping urban wages down. I f  rural wages are merely 
increased to the urban level, the income gap between the educated and uneducated 
widens. What is  needed is  a heavy investment in agricultural education.
To take just one obvious point, i t  seems that there is  a great scope in 
Zimbabwe for investment in rural transport fa c il it ie s .  Only 5 percent of 
African land is  less than 10 miles from ra il compared with 36 percent in the 
case of White farms; conversely, 40 percent of African land, but only 6 percent 
of White land, is  more than 50 miles from ra il.  These figures have probably 
changed since the opening of the direct ra il link  to Beit Bridge, but they do 
give some idea of the iso lation of African areas. Moreover, the poor state 
of roads and tracks in these areas means not only that they have poor access 
to urban markets but that they are frequently cut o ff during the rainy season. 
The African areas clearly have a poor transport infrastructure, and investment 
needs to be directed towards feeder roads, all-weather surfaces and bridges.
The World Bank now recommends a sequential approach to rural development. The 
f i r s t  phase concentrates on a few productive resources, especially food crops, 
in a ll regions of a country. The goal is  to increase output by 4 - 5 percent 
per annum; th is may take between 4 - 7  years, varying from one region to 
another. During the second phase, the aim is  to consolidate these growth 
rates by the intensive provision of agricultural services.
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Such a phased approach allows regional constraints to be identified, data to 
be collected, a greater knowledge of local conditions to be gained, and 
increased local participation in the provision of services to be encouraged. 
Once local incomes have increased, attention can be given to stimulating small- 
scale manufacturing and service ac t iv it ie s  so as to create further income­
earning opportunities fo r the rural population.
Urban Areas
The urban poor are found in both the formal (wage) sector and the informal 
(unauthorised) sector. They consist of urban-born persons and migrants, 
squatters and tenants of council housing. There are a number of components 
of urban policy, but i t  is  important to stress that urban and rural policies 
are linked. Rural development is  necessary to reduce the outflow of people, 
and dispersed urban development to reduce the attractions of the major centres. 
The two strategies must therefore be co-ordinated.
Zimbabwean c it ie s  do not appear to have been characterized by the shme degree 
of rural-urban migration as is  found in most of the Third World. Smout writes 
that "rural migrants are not engulfing Rhodesian c it ie s ".  But the urban 
African population has increased at 5,8 percent per annum since 1969, and 
squatter settlements must be growing. Smout points to a serious backlog of 
housing in most urban areas; in Salisbury the figure is  20 000 housing units. 
Moreover, rural-urban migration may increase under majority rule as restrictions 
on population mobility are lifted  and the policy is  shifted to providing family 
accommodation for the urban African population. One would therefore expect the 
demand for housing to outstrip  the o ff ic ia l supply and for squatter settlements 
to proliferate.
There is  an excellent opportunity for the new government to avoid the mistake 
of thinking that only council housing should be provided. There is  ample 
evidence to suggest that such housing does not meet the needs of the poor, and 
alternative approaches are being taken to the problem of low-income housing. 
The new government w ill have a chance to provide serviced s ite s in advance of 
the acceleration of migration, and i t  would be worthwhile to study the s ite - 
and-service and squatter upgrading project being undertaken in Lusaka.
Housing policy should also be framed in such a way as to maximize employment 
creation.
Another area in which the urban poor can be assisted relates to the creation 
of linkages between the formal and informal sectors and large-scale and small- 
scale manufacturing. The sub-contracting of work and the provision of credit 
and technical advice constitute important aspects of policy^
Servi ces
In addition to housing, the lowest income groups need minimum access to other 
public services - health, education,transport - both in rural and urban areas.
I w ill mention b rie fly  just two of these aspects, namely, health and education.
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Health
In developing countries, health services are typ ically  focused on the 
urban areas where large, modern hospitals, which are beyond the reach of 
the poor, are provided. Moreover, medical services tend to be curative
rather than preventive. Thus planning in the health sector is  now
emphasizing the provision of rural c lin ic s ,  the training of paramedical 
and auxilia ry  sta ff, the provision of clean water and other environmental 
sanitation fa c i l it ie s ,  and mass immunisation programmes. Concomitantly, 
there is  less emphasis on the construction of large modern hospitals.
Education
The direction of education in developing countries has also been questioned. 
In most developing countries the curricula have been academic rather than 
technical, and the concentration on high schools and university education 
has created expectations among the public that are d if f ic u lt ,  and frequently 
impossible, to f u l f i l  on the job market. The allocation of education 
budgets is  biased against the poor since those who benefit from such 
education tend to be the middle- and higher-income groups; there is  a high 
drop-out rate between primary and high school. In addition, education 
fa c i l it ie s  in rural areas tend to be few. The emphasis in education 
planning today is  thus on curricula which are more appropriate to the jobs 
which the youth may re a lis t ic a lly  expect to obtain. In particular, there 
is  a need for agricultural education to overcome the bottleneck in the 
management and improvement of rural development programmes, and on tech­
nical training to alleviate  the shortage of mechanics, artisans and so on.
CONCLUSION
The private sector can expect it s  role to change - from being the dominant 
factor in the economic growth of Rhodesia to that of a partner in a new economic 
policy. How then can the private sector co-exist, or survive in a changed 
climate?
I t  is  arguable that the private sector w ill survive only i f  i t  shows it se lf  to 
be capable of delivering the goods to the entire population. Mr. Andrew Young, 
formerly the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, says he does not 
fear for the future of the free enterprise system in Africa because i t  can 
deliver a high standard of l iv in g  and mass consumption goods to the entire 
population far more e ffic ien tly  than can a so c ia list  system. But in Southern 
Africa thus far, the free enterprise system has not delivered the goods, 
largely because of the interference of institutiona lized  racial discrimination 
in factor markets. Once racial discrimination is  removed, as i t  is  being 
removed in Zimbabwe, the entrepreneurial energies which are associated with 
the private sector can be released and channelled into different directions to 
meet a different set of goals. I f  the private sector wishes to survive, it  
ought to co-operate readily with the government in reaching the optimal 
combination of public sector/private sector participation in the economy. It  
must be seen to be actively a ssist ing  in the removal of racial discrimination 
and it  must benefit a ll income strata in society.
Such a direction may not, however, be popular among the high-income groups.
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But they w ill have to accept that the ir standard of liv in g  has reached it s  
peak and that i t  w ill now have to mark time. This may, of course, not be 
a new experience - the standard of liv in g  has declined since UDI because of 
the shortage of mass consumption goods, and the high-income groups may there­
fore be psychologically attuned to such a situation.
Writing in 1974, Dunlop stated that: "The challenge facing the European 
electorate is  whether i t  can recognise that it s  continued existence depends 
on the economic development of the African rural areas". Today I would 
rephrase th is as follows: "The challenge facing the private sector is  whether 
it  can recognise that it s  continued existence depends on a fundamental 
redistribution of wealth to the majority of the African people". In my view 
Zimbabwe lo st a golden opportunity thirteen years ago of moving in a different 
political direction; i f  businessmen in Zimbabwe misread the future in the same 
way the po litic ian s did in 1965, the private sector w ill face very bleak 
prospects indeed.
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